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Abstract 
The Dunning-Kruger effect refers to the observation that the incompetent are often ill-suited to 
recognize their incompetence. Here we investigate potential Dunning-Kruger effects in high-
level reasoning and, in particular, focus on the relative effectiveness of metacognitive monitoring 
among particularly biased reasoners. Participants who made the greatest number of errors on the 
Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) overestimated their performance on this test by a factor of more 
than three. Overestimation decreased as CRT performance increased and those who scored 
particularly high underestimated their performance. Evidence for this type of systematic 
miscalibration was also found on a self-report measure of analytic thinking disposition. Namely, 
genuinely non-analytic participants (based on CRT performance) over-reported their ‘Need for 
Cognition’ (NC), indicating that they were dispositionally analytic when their objective 
performance indicated otherwise. Furthermore, estimated CRT performance was just as strong a 
predictor of NC as was actual CRT performance. Our results provide evidence for Dunning-
Kruger effects both in estimated performance on the CRT and in self-reported analytic thinking 
disposition. These findings indicate that part of the reason why people are biased is because they 
are either unaware of or indifferent to their own bias.  
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Dunning-Kruger effects in reasoning: Theoretical implications of the failure to recognize 
incompetence  
 If competency is required to recognize incompetence, truly incompetent people will be 
both incompetent and unaware of their incompetence (Dunning, Johnson, Ehrlinger, & Kruger, 
2003; Kruger & Dunning, 1999). The failure to recognize incompetence among the incompetent 
– often referred to as the Dunning-Kruger effect – has far reaching implications because, 
presumably, one of the prerequisites of voluntary self-improvement is actually recognizing the 
need for improvement. Indeed, those who would benefit the most from understanding the limits 
of their reasoning are the ones who are least likely to do so. From a theoretical standpoint, 
estimating the degree of miscalibration among the incompetent is also paramount to 
understanding the causes and consequences of biases in judgment and decision making writ 
large. In the present work, we examine incompetence in the realm of biased or intuitive 
responding in reasoning tasks and provide evidence that Dunning-Kruger effects extend to self-
reported analytic thinking disposition.  
Dual-process theory and analytic thinking disposition. 
The distinction between autonomous/ intuitive (Type 1) processes and deliberative/ 
analytic (Type 2) processes, as formalized in dual-process theories (De Neys, 2012; Evans & 
Stanovich, 2013; Handley & Trippas, 2015; Kahneman, 2011; Pennycook, Fugelsang, & 
Koehler, 2015b; Sloman, 2014; Thompson, Prowse Turner, & Pennycook, 2011), is now 
exceedingly popular in many areas of psychology. One of the key implications of this distinction 
is that analytic thinking proceeds via at least some form of volitional control, which in turn 
indicates that people will differ in terms of their disposition toward analytic thinking. Put simply, 
some people appear to be more willing to engage in deliberative thought than others (Stanovich 
& West, 1998; Stanovich & West, 2000; Stanovich, 2012). Recent research has shown that 
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individual differences in analytic thinking disposition (also referred to as "analytic cognitive 
style") are consequential for a wide range of psychological domains over and above individual 
differences in cognitive ability or intelligence (Pennycook, Fugelsang, & Koehler, 2015a).   
Analytic thinking disposition is also assessed using self-report scales, such as the Need 
for Cognition (NC) scale (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982; Cacioppo, Petty, Feinstein, & Jarvis, 1996; 
Epstein, Pacini, Denes-Raj, & Heier, 1996; Fleischhauer et al., 2010). According to Petty, Brinol, 
Loersch, and McCaslin (2009), Need for Cognition “refers to the tendency for people to vary in 
the extent to which they engage in and enjoy effortful cognitive activities” (p. 318). It includes 
items such as “I am not very good at solving problems that require careful logical analysis” and 
“I enjoy solving problems that require hard thinking”. Thus, “effortful cognitive activities” in 
Petty et al.’s (2009) definition refers specifically to thinking and problem solving.  
Pacini and Epstein (1999) further specified the NC scale by creating subscales that 
distinguish between ‘ability’ and ‘engagement’. This distinction can be seen in the two examples 
offered above: NC includes items that index both the self-reported ability to engage in effortful 
thought and the enjoyment derived therefrom. Contrast, for example, the item “I am much better 
at figuring out things logically than other people” (ability subscale) with the item “I try to avoid 
situations that require thinking in depth about something” (engagement subscale). Thus, Pacini 
and Epstein’s NC scale distinguishes two important components of general analytic thinking 
dispositions in a way that parallels performance-based measures.    
NC has been used frequently in studies on information evaluation and recall, attitude 
formation, and judgment and decision making (see, Petty et al., 2009, for review), along with a 
variety of other domains not traditionally associated with information processing. For example, 
high NC is associated with decreased religious and paranormal belief (Pennycook, Cheyne, Barr, 
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Koehler, & Fugelsang, 2014; Svedholm & Lindeman, 2013), increased life satisfaction 
(Gauthier, Christopher, Walter, Mourad, & Marek, 2006), decreased support for punitive 
responses to crime (Sargent, 2004), and utilitarian moral judgment (Conway & Gawronski, 
2013). Indeed, Petty et al. (2009) note that over 1,000 publications have either cited the article 
that introduced the NC scale (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982) or the article that introduced a shortened 
version of the scale (Cacioppo, Petty, & Kao, 1984).  
Methodological implications of the Dunning-Kruger effect. 
Although the NC scale has been used in hundreds of studies (Cacioppo et al., 1996; Petty 
et al., 2009), research on self-report thinking disposition faces a dilemma: People who are 
genuinely unwilling to engage analytic thinking may not be well suited to estimate their degree 
of NC. Indeed, there is evidence that high NC is associated with increased levels of thinking 
about one’s own thinking (Petty et al., 2009). Moreover, Kruger and Dunning (1999) found that 
people who were in the bottom quartile in terms of logical reasoning estimated that they were 
just above average in terms of accuracy whereas, if anything, those in the top quartile somewhat 
underestimated their performance. Mata, Ferreira, and Sherman, (2013) demonstrated that 
relatively analytic people have a metacognitive advantage over those who rely primarily on their 
intuition because they are aware of both the intuitive answer and the deliberative (typically 
correct) response. Similar to Kruger and Dunning (1999), Mata et al. (2013) found that intuitive 
reasoners strongly overestimate their performance relative to deliberative reasoners. Given that 
people’s “chronic self-views” (i.e., opinion about one’s abilities independent of actual 
performance) have been shown to influence their performance (Atir, Rosenzweig, & Dunning, 
2015; Critcher & Dunning, 2009; Ehrlinger & Dunning, 2003), previous research suggests that 
Miscalibration 6 
 
people overestimate their performance on high-level reasoning tasks precisely because they view 
themselves as more reasonable than is justified by their objective performance. 
Based on this research, we hypothesize that self-report thinking disposition scales are 
miscalibrated in a systematic way, such that those who are genuinely not analytic should over-
state their relative analyticity, whereas people who are genuinely analytic should fairly 
accurately report their NC or perhaps even underreport it relative to others in the sample. In other 
words, the association between NC and objective performance should be similar to the 
association between estimated and objective performance: Overestimation should be largest 
among the most biased and the smallest (or reversed) among the least biased.  
Theoretical implications of the Dunning-Kruger effect.  
The Dunning-Kruger effect has important – although heretofore unspecified – theoretical 
implications for recent work in the field of heuristics and biases in reasoning (but see, Mata, 
Ferreira, et al., 2013 for related empirical work). Namely, there is growing evidence that people 
can recognize (if implicitly) the conflict inherent in many reasoning problems (see De Neys, 
2012; De Neys, 2014 for reviews). For example, consider the following item from the Cognitive 
Reflection Test (Frederick, 2005): 
A bat and ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs $1.00 more than the ball. How much 
does the ball cost?   
Typically, around 65% of participants respond ‘10 cents’ to this problem (e.g., Pennycook, 
Cheyne, Koehler, & Fugelsang, 2016) even though it is incorrect (if the ball costs 10 cents, the 
bat must cost $1.10 and in total they would cost $1.20). This is thought to occur because people 
are cognitive misers (i.e., they conserve mental resources when possible, see Toplak, West, & 
Stanovich, 2011) and unduly rely on the first thing that comes to mind.  
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If the Dunning-Kruger effect applies to this type of problem, those who give incorrect 
intuitive responses would be unlikely to recognize their bias (Mata, Ferreira, et al., 2013). 
Surprisingly, however, there is some evidence that even people who get this problem incorrect 
have some sense that there is something “off” about the problem. Namely, participants who give 
the incorrect intuitive response to conflict problems are less confident relative to when they 
answer a non-conflict version of the task (i.e., one that does not cue an incorrect intuitive 
response; De Neys et al., 2013); a pattern of results that remains even after participants are put 
under cognitive load (Johnson, Tubau, & De Neys, 2016). Such conflict detection has been 
evidenced using a variety of different measures (e.g., response time, De Neys & Glumicic, 2008; 
memory recall, Franssens & De Neys, 2009; skin conductance response, De Neys, Moyens, & 
Vansteenwegen, 2010; fMRI, De Neys, Vartanian, & Goel, 2008; and ERP, Banks & Hope, 
2014) and a wide range of tasks (e.g., syllogisms, De Neys & Franssens, 2009; the conjunction 
fallacy, De Neys, Cromheeke, & Osman, 2011; and ratio bias, Bonner & Newell, 2010).  
Conflict detection during reasoning has been referred to as “omnipresent, regardless of 
whether participants answer problems correctly or incorrectly” (De Neys et al., 2008, p. 488). 
Indeed, there is evidence for conflict detection even among particularly biased participants using 
subtle low-level measures such as skin conductance (De Neys et al., 2010). Interestingly, 
however, this line of research does not appear consistent with the strong evidence for the 
Dunning-Kruger effect. If people are good at detecting conflict during reasoning, why are the 
incompetent so unaware of their incompetence?  
One possibility is that the low-level detection of conflicting outputs, however efficient, 
may not translate into changes in behavior and, ultimately, reductions in biased responding. 
Indeed, recent research indicates that failures of conflict detection (which may be due to either a 
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lack of conflict detection signal or a lack of responsiveness to a present conflict signal) are more 
common than previously thought (Pennycook, Fugelsang, et al., 2015b, 2012). Moreover, there 
is evidence that less analytic individuals are less likely to respond to conflict during reasoning 
(Mevel et al., 2015; Pennycook et al., 2014, 2015b; Thompson & Johnson, 2014). Thus, 
metacognitive monitoring may be more effective among genuinely analytic individuals 
regardless of the effectiveness of conflict detection per se. This suggests that non-analytic 
participants should overestimate their accuracy on problems that include an intuitive, yet 
incorrect lure, like the bat and ball example above (Mata, Ferreira, et al., 2013). More generally, 
the foregoing indicates that analytic individuals may be better suited to assess their relative 
degree of analyticity. 
The current work   
We report two studies in which participants completed a popular performance-based 
measure of analytic thinking disposition, the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT; Frederick, 2005), 
and were subsequently asked to estimate how many of the items they got correct (Mata, Ferreira, 
et al., 2013; Noori, 2016). Following Kruger and Dunning (1999), we hypothesized that 
participants who perform poorly on the CRT will overestimate their performance to a greater 
extent than those who perform well (i.e., less analytic people should be more poorly calibrated). 
In addition, participants were also asked to self-report their need or desire to think analytically 
using the NC scale. We predicted a Dunning-Kruger effect such that participants who perform 
particularly poorly on the CRT (indicating an intuitive or non-analytic thinking disposition) 
would over-report the degree to which they are disposed to analytic thinking. In Study 2, we used 
an independent assessment of analytic thinking – the heuristics and biases inventory (Toplak, 
West, & Stanovich, 2014; Toplak et al., 2011) – to assess whether non-analytic individuals are 
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genuinely worse at recognizing their bias. Put differently, participants who are decidedly non-
analytic based on the performance measure should be less suited to assess their degree of 
analyticity on a self-report measure, leading to poor calibration both in terms of estimated CRT 
accuracy and self-reported NC.  
Study 1 
 Kruger and Dunning's (1999) primary finding was a larger difference between actual 
performance and estimated performance (i.e., miscalibration in the form of overestimation) for 
the incompetent relative to the competent. Thus, participants who perform relatively poor on the 
CRT should overestimate their performance and those who do relatively well should be better 
calibrated (Mata, Ferreira, et al., 2013), which suggests that those who are genuinely non-
analytic may not be aware of their lack of analyticity. 
 Assuming there is good evidence for overconfidence on the estimated CRT task, we can 
then assess the association between this miscalibration and self-reported analytic thinking style 
(via the NC scale). If the tendency to overestimate CRT performance translates into a tendency 
to rate oneself relatively high in Need for Cognition, estimated CRT performance should predict 
NC over and above actual CRT performance. Similarly, the well-established association between 
CRT and NC (e.g., Pennycook, Cheyne, Koehler, & Fugelsang, 2015) should not be evident once 
CRT scores have been calibrated by subtracting estimated CRT scores. Furthermore, these 
findings should hold for both ability and engagement subscales of the NC scale.  
Method 
In all studies, we report how we determined our sample size, all data exclusions, and all 
measures. Data are available online via the Open Science Framework: https://osf.io/syfn8/.  
Participants 
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 We recruited our participants through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk and chose a target N of 
200 to have sufficient power (90%) to detect a moderate effect size (r = .20). We removed 14 
participants because they responded affirmatively when asked if they had responded randomly at 
any point during the survey. We also removed a participant who had missing values for the CRT 
questions. Two additional participants were removed because they gave numerical answers to a 
CRT question that required a non-numerical response. The resulting sample (N = 183, Mean age 
= 33.7, SD age = 9.5) consisted of 99 males and 84 females.  
Materials and Procedure 
 Cognitive Reflection Test. Frederick's (2005) original CRT consisted of 3 math problems 
that reliably cue intuitive but incorrect answers. The test is considered an index of analytic 
thinking disposition because the items require the participant to question a compelling intuitive 
response – a process that requires a willingness to think analytically (Pennycook & Ross, 2016; 
Travers, Rolison, & Feeney, 2016). Since the original CRT has been used extensively on 
Mechanical Turk, we used two recently developed tests that were designed to measure the same 
underlying construct instead of the original measure. Specifically, we used Toplak, West, and 
Stanovich's (2014) 4-item CRT and Thomson and Oppenheimer's (2016) 4-item CRT. The 
number of correct responses for the two CRTs were significantly correlated, r(183) = .336, p < 
.001, and combined to make a scale with acceptable reliability, α = .70. The eight CRT items 
were presented one at time and in a random order for each participant. After completing all CRT 
items, we asked participants to estimate the number of CRT questions that they answered 
correctly. 
 Need for Cognition. Participants then completed Pacini and Epstein's (1999) 20-item 
Need for Cognition scale. Pacini and Epstein’s NC scale consists of ‘ability’ and ‘engagement’ 
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subscales, which were treated as separate scales for present purposes. Items were presented in a 
randomized order and participants responded on a scale from “1) Definitely not true of myself” 
to “5) Definitely true of myself”. Both Ability (NC-A) and Engagement (NC-E)  subscales had 
excellent reliability, α’s = .90, .95 (for NC-A and NC-E, respectively). The full NC scale was 
also reliable, α = .95 
Results and Discussion 
Dunning-Kruger effects in estimated CRT performance  
As predicted, participants overestimated their total accuracy on the eight CRT items. On 
average, participants estimated that they correctly solved 5.59 CRT problems (SD = 1.52), but 
mean performance was only 3.88 (SD = 2.11), t(182) = 11.14, SE = .15, p < .001, d = .82. The 
correlation between estimated and actual CRT performance was modest, r(183) = -.379, p < 
.001, such that actual CRT performance only explains 14.4% of the variance in estimated CRT 
performance. Following Kruger and Dunning (1999), we split the sample into groups, based on 
accuracy, to test whether those who did poorly on the CRT were more strongly miscalibrated 
than those who did better. Although there are only 9 possible scores on the 8-item CRT and, in 
theory, we could use 9 different groups, only a small number of participants scored 0 (N = 4, 
2.2% of the sample) or 8 (N = 8, 4.4% of the sample). Thus, we increased the N in each CRT 
group by combining across accuracy scores and creating four groups (0-2, 3-4, 5-6, 7-8).  
Using a mixed design ANOVA, there was an interaction between CRT group and the 
difference between actual CRT score and estimated CRT score (see Figure 1), F(3, 179) = 56.24, 
MSE = 1.13, p < .001, ƞ2 = .49. As is evident from Figure 1, overestimation decreases (i.e., 
calibration increases) systematically as accuracy increases. To compare rates of calibration 
across CRT categories, we computed a difference score between estimated and actual CRT and 
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compared it across the levels of CRT performance (based on our 4 groups). A post hoc Tukey 
HSD test comparing the difference between estimated and actual CRT performance (i.e., 
calibration) indicated that each of the four groups emerged as separate homogeneous subsets (p < 
.05). Notably, those who scored very low on the CRT (0-2, M = 1.42, 17.8% accuracy) estimated 
that they answered 4.78 questions correctly (59.8% accuracy) – that is, they overestimated by a 
factor of 3.4. Those who correctly answered 3-4 of the CRT problems overestimated by a factor 
of 1.7, whereas those who answered 5-6 problems correctly only overestimated by a factor of 1.1 
(see Figure 1).  
In contrast, and similar to Kruger and Dunning (1999), we found that those who scored 7-
8 underestimated their performance by a factor of 1.1, t(29) = 3.21, p = .003, d = .59. This was 
not driven by the few participants (N = 8) who scored a perfect 8 out of 8 (and for whom it 
would be impossible to overestimate performance – those who scored 7 out of 8 (N = 22) 
estimated that they got, on average, 6.36 (SD = 1) out of 8 correct (which was significantly lower 
than their true score of 7, t(21) = 2.98, p = .007, d = .64. Importantly, those who scored 5-6 out 
of 8 significantly overestimated their performance, t(37) = 4.35, p < .001, d = .71, indicating that 
the monotonic improvement in calibration as CRT performance increases cannot be attributable 
to those who score too high for overestimation to be possible. Moreover, it should be noted that 
these results cannot be attributed to mere regression to the mean. Particularly intuitive 
individuals (those who scored 0-2 out of 8) overestimated by a factor of 3.4 whereas particularly 
analytic individuals (those who scored 7-8 out of 8) underestimated by a factor of 1.1. That is, 
the reported miscalibration is asymmetric in a way predicted by previous research.     
Figure 1 
Miscalibration between actual CRT accuracy and estimated CRT accuracy as a function of CRT 
group (those who score 0-2, 3-4, 5-6, or 7-8 out of 8) in Study 1. Y-Axis represents the number 
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of correct/estimated correct out of 8 CRT problems. Error bars represent 95% confidence 
intervals. Group 1 (0-2) N = 50; Group 2 (3-4) N = 65; Group 3 (5-6) N = 38; Group 4 (7-8) N = 
30.  
 
 
Association between overconfidence and Need for Cognition 
If the NC scale is a good measure of actual analytic thinking disposition, it should 
correlate more strongly with actual CRT performance than estimated performance. However, if 
anything, estimated CRT performance was more strongly correlated with NC, r(183) = .307, p < 
.001, than was actual CRT performance, r(183) = .246, p = .001. This was more evident for the 
ability subscale (NC-A), which correlated with estimated CRT performance nearly as strongly as 
actual CRT performance, r(183) = .352, p < .001, but was more modestly correlated with actual 
CRT performance, r(183) = .242, p = .001. However, there was no difference between the 
magnitude of these correlations via a William’s test, t(180) = 1.42, p = .159. The correlation 
between the engagement subscale (NC-E) and estimated CRT performance, r(183) = .229, p = 
0
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.002, was more similar to actual CRT performance, r(183) = .216, p = .003. Thus, if anything, 
miscalibration was strongest when participants self-reported their ability to engage analytic 
thinking.  
If the tendency to overestimate CRT performance is linked with the tendency to rate 
oneself relatively high on the NC scale, estimated CRT should predict NC over and above actual 
CRT performance. We therefore entered both accuracy and estimated accuracy (along with their 
interaction) as predictors in two regression analyses with NC-A and NC-E as the dependent 
variables (see Table 1). Not only did estimated CRT accuracy significantly predict self-reported 
NC-A and NC-E once actual CRT scores were taken into account, but actual CRT accuracy was 
not a robust predictor once estimated accuracy was taken into account. There was also an 
interaction between estimated accuracy and actual accuracy for both NC subscales. This 
interaction emerged because estimated CRT accuracy was more strongly positively correlated 
with NC for those who did well on the CRT (see Figure S1 in supplementary materials). These 
results indicate a link between miscalibration in analytic thinking and self-reported Need for 
Cognition. As a follow-up analysis, we created a calibration score by taking the difference 
between estimated and actual CRT. This calibration score was not significantly correlated with 
NC-A, r(183) = -.012, p = .871, or NC-E, r(183) = .051, p = .491. This, again, indicates that self-
report NC is as much a measure of estimated CRT performance as it is a measure of actual CRT 
performance. 
Table 1 
Final step of hierarchical multiple regression analysis predicting self-reported Need for 
Cognition with estimated CRT accuracy (CRT Est), actual CRT accuracy (CRT Acc), and their 
interaction (Acc x Est) as predictors. The top panel is the ability subscale (NC-A) and the bottom 
panel is the engagement subscale (NC-E). N = 183.  
(NC-A) r Β t P Tolerance VIF 
Intercept   0.92 .358   
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CRT Acc .242 .101 1.35 .178 .84 1.19 
CRT Est .352 .326 4.40 < .001 .85 1.18 
Acc x Est .166 .179 2.59 .010 .98 1.02 
       
(NC-E) r Β t P Tolerance VIF 
Intercept   0.86 .392   
CRT Acc .216 .126 1.63 .106 .84 1.19 
CRT Est .229 .193 2.50 .013 .85 1.18 
Acc x Est .169 .170 2.38 .019 .98 1.02 
 
Study 2 
 In Study 1, those who were prone to errors on the CRT were more likely to overestimate 
their performance – a Dunning-Kruger effect. Moreover, consistent with previous research in 
other domains (Atir et al., 2015; Critcher & Dunning, 2009; Ehrlinger & Dunning, 2003), 
estimates of CRT accuracy were as predictive of self-reported analytic thinking disposition as 
was actual CRT accuracy. These findings suggest that self-report measures of thinking 
disposition may lack precision. Overconfidence among those genuinely low in analytic thinking 
may translate into overestimates of self-report analytic thinking whereas proper calibration (or, if 
anything, under-confidence) among those genuinely high in analytic thinking may translate into 
relative underestimates of self-report analytic thinking. In other words, it may be the case that 
those who rely on their intuition are not analytic enough to know that they are not analytic 
whereas analytic people are analytic enough to know the limits of their analyticity. 
Although the results of Study 1 were consistent with the proposed Dunning-Kruger effect 
in self-reported thinking disposition, the evidence was indirect. Specifically, the same 
performance-based analytic thinking disposition measure, the CRT, was used to make inferences 
about miscalibration for both estimated CRT score and self-reported NC. To overcome this 
limitation, we included a separate measure of analytic thinking: the heuristics and biases 
inventory (H&B; Toplak, West, & Stanovich, 2011). Having a second performance-based 
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(‘objective’) measure of analytic thinking will allow us to more directly test the hypothesis that 
NC scores are systematically miscalibrated. That is, the difference between actual and estimated 
CRT performance (calibration) should be associated with objective H&B performance, but not 
self-reported NC. This would illustrate a correspondence between objective measures of analytic 
thinking even after miscalibration has been taken into account. There should be no likewise 
correspondence with self-report NC because, presumably, this miscalibration also affects 
people’s perception of their analytic thinking disposition.  
Including a second objective measure of analytic thinking will also allow us to compare 
relative performance on our two analytic thinking benchmarks (CRT and H&B) with relative 
self-reported Need for Cognition by creating a number of additional calibration scores. 
Individuals who are not particularly analytic (based on relative CRT and H&B score) should 
nonetheless rate themselves as relatively analytic (based on self-reported NC). We predict that 
the difference between relative CRT performance and self-reported NC will correlate positively 
with H&B performance (and, likewise, the difference between H&B and NC will correlate with 
CRT). In other words, there should be miscalibration between NC and our objective measures of 
analytic thinking in the same way that there is miscalibration between estimated and actual CRT 
scores. This would be akin to a Dunning-Kruger effect in self-reported analytic thinking 
disposition. As in Study 1, this should be evident for both ability and engagement subscales of 
the NC scale. 
Method 
Data are available online via the Open Science Framework: https://osf.io/z6trc/.  
Participants 
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 In total, 400 participants were recruited from Mechanical Turk1. We removed 56 
participants because they responded affirmatively when asked if they had responded randomly at 
any point during the survey and 3 participants who had missing data for the CRT. The resulting 
sample (N = 341, Mean age = 33.9, SD age = 10.5) consisted of 200 males and 139 females. 
Materials and Procedure 
 Cognitive Reflection Test. The CRT was administered as in Study 1. The two CRT scales 
were significantly correlated, r(341) = .362, p < .001, but the scale had weaker reliability than in 
Study 1, α = .65. One participant estimated that they solved 9 out of 8 CRT problems correctly, 
so we changed the value to 8. 
 Heuristics and biases battery. As an independent measure of analytic thinking, we used 
Toplak et al.'s (2011) heuristics and biases battery. The scale consists of 16 problems that were 
derived from Kahneman and Tversky’s heuristics and biases research program (see Kahneman, 
2011 for a review). Items include biases such as the gambler’s fallacy and the conjunction fallacy 
(see appendix in Toplak et al., 2011). The scale had weak reliability, α = .68.  
Need for Cognition. The NC scale was administered as in Study 1, except in this case it 
followed the heuristics and biases battery and was presented before a paranormal belief scale 
(which will not be considered further, see supplementary materials). One participant had an 
outlying NC score (3 SD below the mean) – subsequent analyses are reported with the outlier 
                                               
1 We originally collected data for 200 participants using the same stopping rule as in Study 1. 
However, upon completing data collection for the first 200 participants in this study, an error in 
the CRT estimate question was discovered (which also applied to Study 1). Specifically, 
participants were told to input a number between 1 and 8 instead of between 0 and 8. We 
therefore re-ran Study 2 with the corrected instructions. Fortunately, only one participant guessed 
that they got 0 out of 8 correct when given the corrected instructions (no participants indicated 0 
in Study 1 or the first run of Study 2). Estimated CRT performance was identical regardless of 
whether participants were told to enter a number from 1 to 8 or 0 to 8, t(339) = .04, p = .971. 
Thus, we report the data for the full set of 400 participants below.   
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removed, although the pattern of results was identical. The subscales were reliable, α = .89, .94 
for NC-A and NC-E, respectively. 
Results and Discussion 
Dunning-Kruger effects in estimated CRT performance 
Estimated CRT accuracy (M = 5.62, SD = 1.59) was greater than actual accuracy (M = 
3.85, SD = 1.98), t(340) = 16.42, SE = .11, p < .001, d = .89. As in Study 1, we split the sample 
into four groups based on accuracy of CRT scores to examine the relationship between actual 
and estimated CRT scores. Using a mixed design ANOVA, there was an interaction between 
low/high CRT group and the difference between actual CRT score and estimated CRT score (see 
supplementary Figure S2), F(3, 337) = 92.64, MSE = 1.09, p < .001, ƞ2 = .45. A post hoc Tukey 
HSD test comparing the difference between estimated and actual CRT performance (i.e., 
calibration) indicated that all four groups emerged as separate homogeneous subsets (p < .05). 
This indicates a decrease in overestimation at each increasing level of CRT performance. As in 
Study 1, those who scored lowest on the CRT (0-2 correct) overestimated their performance by a 
factor of 3.4. Even those who scored 5-6 out of 8 significantly overestimated their performance, 
t(52) = 6.63, p < .001, d = .67. In contrast, those who scored highest (7-8 correct) significantly 
underestimated their performance, t(33) = 3.86, p = .001, d = .66.  
Association between overconfidence and Need for Cognition 
 Here we will replicate the associations between estimated and actual CRT performance 
and NC. Correlations among primary variables can be found in Table 2. As in Study 1, the 
correlation between NC and actual CRT performance were not significantly different (although 
in this case, nominally larger for NC-E) to the correlation between NC and estimated CRT 
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performance, t < 12. To estimate the extent to which actual CRT accuracy and estimated CRT 
accuracy predict NC, we entered both variables (along with their interaction) as predictors in two 
regression analyses with NC-A and NC-E as a dependent variables (see Table 3). Unlike in 
Study 1, both actual and estimated CRT accuracy (along with their interaction, see Figure S3 in 
supplementary materials) significantly independently predicted NC-A and only actual CRT 
significantly predicted NC-E. These independent associations were relatively modest, however; 
β’s ranged from .120-181.  
                                               
2 Supernatural (religious and paranormal) belief was more strongly correlated with actual CRT 
accuracy, r(341) = -.278, p < .001, than estimated CRT accuracy, r(341) = -.093, p = .086, t(338) 
= 3.23, p = .001. This provides an existence proof for the idea that actual CRT can be more 
predictive than estimated CRT accuracy. 
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Table 2. Correlations (Pearson r) among primary variables in Study 2. N = 341.  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1. CRT Accuracy  -         
2. Estimated CRT Accuracy .400*** -        
3. Need for Cognition - Ability .202*** .203*** -       
4. Need for Cognition - Engagement .190*** .133* .672*** -      
5. Heuristics & Biases .411*** .326*** .194*** .203*** -     
6. CRT1 – Estimated Accuracy2 (Calibration1) .676*** -.404*** .038 .082 .148** -    
7. CRT1 – NC-A3 (Calibration2) .632*** .156** -.632*** -.382*** .172** .505*** -   
8. H&B4 – NC-A3 (Calibration3) .165** .097 -.635*** -.369*** .635*** .086 .633*** -  
9. CRT1 – H&B4 .543*** -.068 -.007 .012 .543*** -.487*** -.424*** .433*** - 
***indicates p < .001, **indicates p < .01, *indicates p < .05 
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Table 3 
Final step of a hierarchical multiple regression analysis predicting self-reported Need for 
Cognition with estimated CRT accuracy (CRT Est), actual CRT accuracy (CRT Acc), and their 
interaction (Acc x Est) as predictors. The top panel is the ability subscale (NC-A) and the bottom 
panel is the engagement subscale (NC-E). N = 341. 
(NC-A) r Β t p Tolerance VIF 
Intercept   0.86 .389   
CRT Acc .202 .122 2.11 .036 .82 1.23 
CRT Est .203 .181 3.04 .003 .78 1.29 
Acc x Est .087 .120 2.20 .028 .92 1.08 
 
(NC-E) r Β T p Tolerance VIF 
Intercept   0.44 .657   
CRT Acc .190 .151 2.56 .011 .82 1.23 
CRT Est .133 .087 1.44 .150 .78 1.29 
Acc x Est .052 .063 1.13 .258 .92 1.08 
 
As in Study 1, neither NC-A or NC-E were associated with the difference between actual 
and estimated CRT performance, r’s < .085, p’s > .130 (Calibration1; see Table 2).  In contrast, 
H&B performance did positively associate with Calibration1, r(341) = .148, p = .006. Thus, 
there was a correspondence between objective measures of analytic thinking (CRT and H&B) 
even after miscalibration (CRT estimates) have been taken into account. This pattern of results 
was not evident for self-reported NC because, presumably, the miscalibration that is reflected in 
estimated CRT performance also affects people’s perception of their analytic thinking 
disposition. 
Dunning-Kruger effects in self-reported Need for Cognition 
To further test the hypothesis that participants who are genuinely low in analytic thinking 
over-report their NC, we created three additional calibration scores. We did this by converting 
CRT, H&B, and NC raw scores into z-scores and computed their difference scores (Table 2). 
The conversion to z-scores allows us to compare participants’ relative position on the three 
ostensibly linked measures. The goal is to treat self-reported NC in the same way as estimated 
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CRT scores. For this analysis, we decreased the number of comparisons by focusing on the 
ability subscale (NC-A), which more directly relates to people’s assessments of their analytic 
thinking disposition (as opposed to mere enjoyment of analytic thinking)3.  
If NC-A is miscalibrated in the same way as estimated CRT scores, as we have predicted, 
there should be a correspondence between the parallel estimate-based and NC-based calibration 
scores. Indeed, the difference between the z-scores for CRT accuracy and NC-A correlated 
positively with H&B performance (‘Calibration2’; Table 2), r(341) = .172, p = .001. 
Correspondingly, the difference between the z-scores for H&B accuracy and NC-A correlated 
positively with CRT performance (‘Calibration3’; Table 2), r(341) = .165, p = .002. Participants 
who were less analytic based on H&B performance were more likely to rate themselves as 
relatively higher in NC than would be warranted given their CRT performance (and vice versa). 
There was no corresponding correlation between NC-A and the difference between the z-scores 
for CRT and H&B, r(341) = -.007, p = .894, which indicates a dissociation between self-reported 
and performance-based measures of analytic thinking.  
This analysis illustrates that self-reported Need for Cognition (ability subscale) is more 
similar (in terms of its correlates) to estimated Cognitive Reflection Test performance than to 
actual Cognitive Reflection Test or heuristics and biases performance. To summarize, self-
reported Need for Cognition does not predict the difference between actual and estimated 
Cognitive Reflection Test performance, but heuristics and biases performance does predict this 
difference. Moreover, when the difference between relative (actual) Cognitive Reflection Test 
                                               
3 The results are nonetheless essentially identical when NC-E is used in place of NC-A. 
Specifically, the difference between the z-scores for CRT accuracy and NC-E correlated 
positively with H&B performance (akin to ‘Calibration2’ in Table 2), r(341) = .176, p = .001. 
The difference between the z-scores for H&B accuracy and NC-E correlated positively with 
CRT performance (akin to ‘Calibration3’ in Table 2), r(341) = .163, p = .002 
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and Need for Cognition scores is used as a calibration score, heuristics and biases performance 
predicts that as well. Similarly, when the difference between heuristics and biases performance 
and Need for Cognition is used like a calibration score, Cognitive Reflection Test performance 
predicts that. Finally, to complete the full set of possible analyses, the difference between 
Cognitive Reflection Test and heuristics and biases performance is not predicted by Need for 
Cognition since it is not a meaningful difference (unlike the difference between CRT/H&B and 
NC scores, as hypothesized).  
To illustrate the source of the Dunning-Kruger effect on self-reported NC, we will focus 
on the parallel between two independent patterns of results: 1) The difference between actual and 
estimated CRT scores as a function of CRT group (Figure 2): interaction, F(3, 337) = 92.64, 
MSE = 1.09, p < .001, ƞ2 = .45; and 2) The difference between H&B performance and self-
reported NC as a function of CRT group (Figure 3): interaction, NC (full scale); F(3, 337) = 
2.92, MSE = .77 p = .034, ƞ2 = .03; NC-A; F(3, 337) = 2.79, MSE = .79 p = .040, ƞ2 = .02;, NC-E; 
F(3, 337) = 2.87, MSE = .78 p = .012, ƞ2 = .03. In both cases, there is an interaction such that 
estimated accuracy/self-report NC is larger than objective performance for those who score 
relatively low on the CRT, but this difference decreases and eventually reverses as CRT 
performance increases. Indeed, the comparison between H&B performance and NC indicates 
that, if anything, particularly analytic individuals are underreporting their NC relative to the 
remainder of the sample. It should be noted, however, that the confidence intervals overlap 
substantially at every level in this analysis despite the overall evidence for an interaction (see 
Figure 3).      
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Figure 2 
Miscalibration between actual CRT accuracy and estimated CRT accuracy as a function of CRT 
group (those who score 0-2, 3-4, 5-6, or 7-8 out of 8) in Study 2. Y-Axis represents the number 
of correct/estimated correct out of 8 CRT problems. Error bars represent 95% confidence 
intervals. Group 1 (0-2) N = 96; Group 2 (3-4) N = 113; Group 3 (5-6) N = 98; Group 4 (7-8) N = 
34. 
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Figure 3 
Miscalibration between heuristics and biases performance (H&B) and self-reported Need for 
Cognition (ability, NC-A; engagement, NC-E) as a function of CRT group (those who score 0-2, 
3-4, 5-6, or 7-8 out of 8) in Study 2. Y-Axis represents z-scores. Error bars represent 95% 
confidence intervals. Group 1 (0-2) N = 96; Group 2 (3-4) N = 113; Group 3 (5-6) N = 98; Group 
4 (7-8) N = 34. 
 
 
General Discussion 
 Our results provide empirical support for Dunning-Kruger effects in both estimates of 
reasoning performance and self-reported thinking disposition. Particularly intuitive individuals 
greatly overestimated their performance on the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) – a tendency 
that diminished and eventually reversed among analytic individuals. Moreover, self-reported 
analytic thinking disposition – as measured by the ‘ability’ and ‘engagement’ subscales of the 
Need for Cognition (NC) scale – was just as strongly (if not more strongly) correlated with 
estimated CRT performance than actual CRT performance. In addition, an analysis using an 
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additional performance-based measure of analytic thinking – the heuristics and biases battery 
(H&B) – revealed a systematic miscalibration on self-reported NC wherein relatively intuitive 
individuals report that they are more analytic than is justified by their objective performance. 
Together, these findings indicate that participants who are low in analytic thinking (so-called 
“intuitive thinkers”) are at least somewhat unaware of (or unresponsive to) their propensity to 
rely on intuition in lieu of analytic thought during decision making. This conclusion is consistent 
with previous research that suggests that the propensity to think analytically facilitates 
metacognitive monitoring during reasoning (Pennycook, Fugelsang, & Koehler, 2015b; 
Thompson & Johnson, 2014). Those who are genuinely analytic are aware of the strengths and 
weaknesses of their reasoning, whereas those who are genuinely non-analytic are perhaps best 
described as “happy fools” (De Neys et al., 2013).  
 This research has both methodological and theoretical implications. With respect to 
methodological implications, self-report measures of thinking disposition such as the NC scale 
have been used in hundreds of studies (Cacioppo et al., 1996; Petty et al., 2009). Nonetheless, 
correlations with NC are often modest. In the current work, for example, correlations (Pearson’s 
r) between performance-based measures of analytic thinking and the ‘ability’ and ‘engagement’ 
NC subscales ranged from .190 to .242. Given the evidence for systematic miscalibration among 
genuinely non-analytic individuals, we suggest that the predictive power of analytic thinking 
dispositions may have been underestimated in research that has focused on self-report measures. 
Future research should continue to explore whether performance-based measures of analytic 
thinking yield stronger associations than self-report measures. 
In terms of theoretical implications, there has been a recent surge in metacognitive 
perspectives in the realm of dual-process theory. For example, Thompson and colleagues 
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(Thompson et al., 2011, 2013) have provided evidence that ‘feelings of rightness’ are predictive 
of the extent and quality of analytic thinking. Mata, et al. (2013) found a metacognitive 
advantage for deliberative reasoners because they are aware of both the intuitive and reflective 
responses to reasoning problems. In contrast, much research indicates that people are capable of 
detecting conflict between competing reasoning outputs (see De Neys, 2012; De Neys, 2014 for 
reviews). Indeed, as mentioned earlier, conflict detection has been referred to as “omnipresent” 
(De Neys et al., 2008, p. 488) and even particularly biased participants have been shown to have 
an increased skin conductance response when faced with a conflict-inducing reasoning problem 
(De Neys et al., 2010). This indicates that even the most biased of reasoners can be sensitive to 
stimuli that cue conflicting responses.  
The contrast between these lines of research is particularly stark when it comes to the 
Cognitive Reflection Test. Whereas De Neys et al. (2013) found that even people who gave the 
intuitive response to the bat and ball problem (as highlighted in the introduction) were only 
around 82% confident in their response (compared to 97% confidence on a control version of the 
problem), the present results indicate that those who perform poorly on the CRT massively 
overestimate their accuracy (i.e., by a factor > 3). This contraposition indicates that the 
neurological (e.g., De Neys et al., 2008) and physiological (De Neys et al., 2010) conflict 
detection signal may be relatively effective, but the response to this signal may actually be rather 
ineffective. De Neys et al. (2013) found a large (15%) decrease in confidence for the bat and ball 
problem relative to a control, but 82% confidence is still quite high.   
There is also evidence from verbal protocols that conflict detection is often implicit (De 
Neys & Glumicic, 2008) and it seems likely that it may only become explicit upon further 
reflection via analytic processing. Thus, given that analytic thinking relies (to some extent) on 
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volitional control, the presence of a signal to think analytically does not guarantee that the 
individual will engage in more than cursory levels of analytic thought. This line of reasoning is 
supported by both the present findings and previous work showing that the propensity to think 
analytically correlates with increases in response time for biased responses to incongruent 
(conflict) base-rate problems (Pennycook et al., 2014; Pennycook, Fugelsang, & Koehler, 
2015b). That is, more analytic individuals engaged in more substantive analytic thinking even in 
cases where they ultimately rationalized their initial (‘biased’) response. Collectively, these 
findings reveal pervasive differences between intuitive and analytic individuals at various levels 
of cognitive functioning.  
The present results are also unique in the sense that they illustrate the everyday 
consequences of metacognitive differences as a function of analytic thinking. Namely, less 
analytic people are not only less effective at metacognitive monitoring when given a reasoning 
task, but they may also be less accurate at self-reporting their relative level of analytic thinking. 
It may be the case that this metacognitive advantage for analytic individuals may be part of the 
reason why analytic thinking is associated with a wide range of important psychological factors 
such as morality, religiosity, and creativity (see Pennycook, Fugelsang, & Koehler, 2015a). 
Thinking about how one thinks may influence how and what people think about. Indeed, our 
results suggest that part of the reason why debates in areas such as politics are so futile is 
because those for which overconfidence is the most consequential (i.e., those who need the most 
correcting, due to their low level of analyticity) are the least likely to recognize their 
overconfidence. Those most likely to be biased are also the least likely to recognize their bias.  
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